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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 09-2340
            
CARMEN VEGA,
                             Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 3-07-cv-02975)
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 14, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed    December 23, 2009  )
            
OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Carmen Vega appeals from the District Court’s order affirming the
denial by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of her application for Social Security
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1
405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).  We have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
Disability benefits. We will affirm.1
I. 
Judicial review is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.”  Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  If the Commissioner’s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, such findings are binding.  Knepp v. Apfel, 204 
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are aware of the relevant facts, we
discuss them only briefly.  Vega is a forty-four-year-old woman with a 12th grade
education.  Her prior experience includes work as a hospital registration clerk, assembly
worker, billing clerk, and a waitress.  Vega’s last full-time job, as a wireless
communications clerk, ended in February 2004. 
Vega filed for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income in
June 2004, alleging inability to work due to symptoms of Grave’s disease.  The
Commissioner denied both Vega’s initial claim and a subsequent request for
reconsideration.  Vega then obtained a hearing before the ALJ.
3In that hearing, Vega testified that she was diagnosed with Grave’s disease in
September 2003 and stopped working due to related symptoms such as shortness of
breath, hand tremors, blurred vision, irritability, depression, and pain in her bones and
joints.  Vega acknowledged that she did not like taking medication and that she had not
always “tak[en] [her treatment] very seriously.”  She also noted that she often missed
appointments with her doctors because of memory problems.  
Vega asserted that her symptoms precluded her from walking more than five or ten
minutes, standing for more than twenty minutes, lifting, sitting, interacting with others,
being alone, and staying focused on tasks.  Although she claimed her daily activities were
limited by these symptoms, Vega had begun to work part-time in a clerical position, as
part of a welfare-mandated program, just weeks before the hearing.  Vega testified that
doing part-time work was difficult, that she had already been absent twice as a result of
her disease, and that she could not do clerical work eight hours a day.
After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Vega’s claims related to her physical
limitations were “not credible,” Tr. at 19, noting that Vega has the “residual functional
capacity [to] perform sedentary work” such as a data entry clerk or a hospital admissions
clerk.  Tr. at 21.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded, Vega was “not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.”  Tr. at 15. 
Vega filed a request for review of the ALJ hearing decision, which the Social
Security Administration Appeals Council denied.  Vega then filed her action in the United
4States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which issued a memorandum opinion
and order affirming the decision of the Commissioner.  Vega timely appealed. 
II.
Vega is disabled for purposes of the SSA only if her “physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her]
previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled under the SSA, ALJs must perform a
five-step, sequential evaluation.  20 C.F.R § 404.1520.  The ALJ must review: (1) the
claimant’s current work activity; (2) the severity of the claimant’s impairments; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the requirements of an impairment
listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
return to past relevant work; and (5) if claimant cannot return to past relevant work,
whether she can “make an adjustment to other work” in the national economy.  Id.  If the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claim will be denied.  Burnett v.
Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000).  Similarly, if the claimant
fails to show that her disabilities are severe, she is ineligible for benefits.  Id. 
The ALJ followed this procedure in determining whether Vega met the definition
of disability for purposes of the SSA.  He determined that Vega had not been engaged in
5substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of February 1, 2004, that
Vega’s impairment was “severe,” but that it did not “meet or medically equal” any
impairments listed in the regulations, and that Vega had the residual functional capacity
to do sedentary work in the areas of her past employment.  Because he concluded that
Vega was not disabled, the ALJ was not required to reach the fifth step.
Vega contends that this determination was improperly based on evidence that she
had not been compliant with her prescribed treatment plan.  It is true, as Vega asserts, that
the ALJ referred to evidence of Vega’s noncompliance in his findings.  It is also true that
a denial of benefits for failure to follow a prescribed treatment plan may only be issued
after the ALJ finds a disabling impairment that precludes engaging in any substantial
activity, SSR 82-59, a finding that the ALJ did not make here.  
However, it was not Vega’s noncompliance with her treatment that was the basis
for the denial of benefits; rather, it was her residual functional capacity to return to
sedentary work.  Viewed in the context of the ALJ’s findings as a whole, his reference to
Vega’s noncompliance shows that he treated it as a factor in analyzing the credibility of
Vega’s testimony.  Because an ALJ may consider a claimant less credible if the individual
fails to follow the prescribed treatment plan without good reason, see SSR 96-7p, this was
not improper.  
Vega next argues that the ALJ erred by not considering her subjective symptoms in
his finding that Vega could return to prior relevant work.  This contention lacks merit
6because the ALJ considered Vega’s testimony on her symptoms, as well as relevant
medical evidence.  Indeed, it was only after examining such evidence that the ALJ found
Vega’s claims regarding the disabling effect of her symptoms “not totally credible.”  Tr.
at 20.   
Vega further contends that the ALJ’s failure to list the specifics of her reported
symptoms constituted legal error because he did not follow the policy set forth in SSR 96-
8, which requires ALJs to consider all relevant evidence when assessing claimants’
residual functional capacities.  However, a review of the ALJ’s findings shows that he
listed the symptoms considered, evaluated those symptoms in light of Vega’s testimony
and the medical evidence, and found that she could lift up to ten pounds, walk and stand
occasionally, and sit up to six hours per day.  SSR 96-8p requires ALJs to provide a
“narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.”  The ALJ’s
findings met this standard. 
Vega also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to make specific findings regarding
the demands of Vega’s past work or the demands of similar positions in the national
economy, as is required by SSR 82-62.  But the ALJ cited a vocational expert’s testimony
as to the physical and mental demands of Vega’s past work and considered Vega’s
testimony as to the demands of her past work.  In light of this evidence, the ALJ
determined that Vega still retained the capacity to perform work, “sedentary and semi-
skilled in nature, as generally performed for employers in the national economy.” Tr. at
719.  This finding was substantially supported by the record. 
Finally, Vega’s argument that the ALJ erred in misstating the disability standard is
unavailing.  Although the ALJ may have been imprecise when he stated that “there [was]
no indication from [Vega’s] treating physician that her limitations would preclude all
work activity,” Tr. at 19, this error does not require reversal. Tr. 19-20.  The ALJ
followed the proper five-step procedure in the disability analysis, and his finding that
Vega was able to continue substantial gainful activity, which is the proper legal standard,
is supported by the record.
III. 
 For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment and order of the District
Court. 
